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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a model that explains the nonneutrality of money from two well-
documented psychological assumptions. The model incorporates into the general-equilibrium
monopolistic-competition framework of Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] the psychological as-
sumptions that (1) consumers dislike paying a price that exceeds some “fair” markup on firms’
marginal costs, and (2) consumers do not know firms’ marginal costs and fail to infer them
from prices. The first assumption in isolation renders the economy more competitive with-
out changing any of its qualitative properties; in particular, money remains neutral. The two
assumptions together cause money to be nonneutral: greater money supply induces lower mo-
nopolistic markups, higher hours worked, and higher output. Whereas an increase in money
supply is expansionary, it decreases the fairness of transactions perceived by consumers to
such an extent that it reduces overall welfare. The cost of inflation is a psychological one
that derives from a mistaken belief by consumers that transactions have become less fair. In
fact, it is this misperception that makes an increase in money supply expansionary: consumers
misattribute the higher prices arising from higher money supply to higher markups; the mis-
perception of higher markups angers them and makes their demand for goods more elastic; in
response, monopolists reduce their markups, thus stimulating economic activity. Through a
similar mechanism, an increase in technology induces higher output but higher monopolistic
markups and lower hours worked.
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1 Introduction
A trove of empirical evidence suggests that people care about fairness and dislike paying prices
that they view as unfair. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986] present evidence that while most
people regard it as acceptable for firms to raise prices in response to higher marginal costs, they find
it unfair for firms to raise prices in response to elevated demand. Because consumers typically do
not know firms’ marginal costs, their perceptions of how fairly firms price their goods depend upon
their estimates of these marginal costs. Rational consumers should be able to invert firms’ pricing
rules and infer marginal costs in equilibrium. Yet copious evidence indicates that people infer less
than rationally by failing to glean the informational content of other people’s actions. Consumers
who underinfer the hidden information that prices convey about marginal cost misattribute high
prices to high markups rather than to high marginal costs and thus find rising prices unfair.
In this paper, we show that these two well-documented psychological traits—concern for fair-
ness and failure to infer information rationally—naturally explain the nonneutrality of money.
The analysis is based on the canonical macroeconomic model by Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987],
modified to incorporate these two psychological traits. The Blanchard-Kiyotaki model is a static
general-equilibrium model with goods, labor, and money, and monopolistic competition on the
goods and labor markets.
In modeling fairness concerns, we assume that the utility people derive from a good depends
upon the perceived fairness of its purchase price. People dislike paying prices that exceed a fair
markup on firms’ marginal costs. Since paying a higher markup for some good lowers the marginal
utility of consuming that good, consumers withhold demand when they perceive prices to be un-
fairly high. Specifically, we assume that consumption utility is scaled by a factor that measures the
perceived fairness of the transaction, based on the observed price and the consumer’s estimate of
the good’s marginal cost. When good i is sold at price Pi and is produced at a perceived marginal
cost of MCi, consumers perceive its markup to be µ pi = Pi/MCi. When consumers judge the fair
markup for good i to be some µ fi , they weight each unit of consumption of good i by a factor of
ψi = 1− (φ/µ p) · (µ pi − µ fi ). Here φ parametrizes fairness concerns and µ p is the average per-
ceived markup across all goods. When φ = 0 we have the classic case without fairness concerns.
When φ > 0 consumption utility is sensitive to the perceived fairness of the transaction.
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Such fairness concerns alter two properties of the price-elasticity of the demand for good i. In
the Blanchard-Kiyotaki model, the elasticity of the demand for good i is constant and equal to ε ,
the elasticity of substitution across goods. Consider now the model with fairness concerns. First,
an increase in the price of good i increases the opportunity cost of consumption, as in the standard
case, but it also increases the perceived markup, thus decreasing the enjoyment of consumption
and reducing further the demand for good i. As a result, the elasticity of the demand for good i
is greater than ε . Second, we show that the elasticity of the demand for good i increases with the
elasticity of the fairness factorψi with respect to Pi. As Pi increases, ψi falls because consumers fell
less fairly treated, and ∂ψi/∂Pi remains constant. Hence, the elasticity (Pi/ψi) · (∂ψi/∂Pi) clearly
increases. As a result, the elasticity of the demand for good i increases with Pi. The properties
that the elasticity of the demand for good i is greater than ε and increasing with Pi are critical to
understand the properties of the model with fairness concerns.
In our model, because consumers do not know firms’ marginal costs, the inference they draw
about them in equilibrium plays a pivotal role. When consumers know or can rationally infer
firms’ marginal costs, and hence markups, from the prices they observe, their dislike of unfair
markups increases the elasticity of demand, leading monopolistic firms to set lower markups. This
renders the economy more competitive: output and hours worked exceed their no-fairness levels.
But the qualitative features of the economy do not differ from the case without fairness concerns;
importantly, money remains neutral.
In light of robust evidence that people fail to think through the hidden information revealed by
the actions of others, we also depart from the assumption of full rationality. Instead, we assume
that although consumers attend to prices, which are salient, they fail to attend to the less direct
information these prices reveal about hidden marginal costs. Specifically, we make the crude but
tractable assumption that consumers make no inference about marginal costs from prices, nor from
any other available information. We regard this failure to infer as a form of neglect: consumers
simply fail to think through how prices are contingent upon marginal cost in equilibrium. Formally,
we assume that consumers do not update their prior beliefs over firms’ marginal costs in response
to anything they observe. We refer to consumers who fail to infer marginal costs from prices and
other economic variables as cursed.
This simple assumption is consistent with failures of contingent thinking captured by the fully
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cursed equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin [2005] and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium of
Jehiel [2005] and Jehiel and Koessler [2008]. It is also broadly consistent with the salience logic
of Gennaioli and Shleifer [2010], who assume that people infer information by drawing upon
a limited set of scenarios that come more easily to mind; here, higher prices suggest increased
markups and greed rather than higher marginal costs. Also related is the coarse-thinking model
of Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer [2008]. Households in our model are coarse thinkers
in that they do not distinguish between the scenarios where price changes reflect cost changes and
those where they reflect markup changes.
When the assumptions of fairness concerns and cursed inference are combined, money is no
longer neutral. Instead, we find that an increase in money supply causes monopolistic markups
to fall, stimulating economic activity. After an increase in money supply, consumers misattribute
the higher prices to higher markups. The misperception of higher markups angers consumer and
increases the elasticity of demand. In response, monopolists reduce their markups. Two critical
properties of the general equilibrium are that (1) the markup is equal to the inverse of the real
marginal cost, and (2) the real marginal cost is an increasing function of hours worked. Therefore,
a lower markup implies higher real marginal cost and thus higher hours worked, which in turn
implies higher output.
We also find that the price level rises less than proportionally with money supply. Hence, our
model generates a mild form of price rigidity. The pass-through—the elasticity of the price level to
money supply—measures the amount of rigidity. We find that when consumers are more sensitive
to fairness or when the economy is less competitive, the pass-through is lower and the price level
therefore more rigid.
Even though an increase in money supply stimulates the economy, it lowers welfare. On the one
hand, an increase in money supply reduces markups and thus the inefficiency due to monopolistic
competition. On the other hand, and even though actual markups fall, an increase in money supply
raises perceived markups due to consumers’ mistaken inference, in turn upsetting consumers who
mistakenly believe that transactions have become less fair. We find that the second effect dominates
the first in consumers’ utility so that overall welfare decreases after an increase in money supply.
At the same time, ignoring the fairness component of utility—the disutility consumers experience
from being angered by unfair prices—we find that “unemotional” welfare always rises.
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Last, we analyze the effects of technology shocks. We find that higher technology leads to
higher output but higher markups and lower hours worked. The logic mirrors that following a
monetary shock. After an increase in technology, consumers fail to infer that lower prices reflect
lower marginal costs. Hence, the perceived markup and thus the elasticity of demand falls, lead-
ing firms to charge higher markups. The higher markups reduce the number of hours worked.
Although markups increase, people mistakenly believe that transactions have become more fair.
Relation to the Literature. Explaining the nonneutrality of money is a classical problem in
macroeconomics, addressed by many models. Most feature monopolistic firms selling goods sub-
ject to some exogenous price-setting friction.1 In these models as in ours, money-supply shocks
propagate through the economy via the monopolistic markups: increasing money supply raises
prices but lowers markups and thus stimulates output. But in existing models, consumers correctly
infer markups from prices, so they understand that, although prices increase after an increase in
money supply, firms’ per-unit profits fall. This prediction seems at odds with evidence that people
feel cheated by rising prices. In a survey conducted by Shiller [1996], 85% of respondents report
that they dislike inflation because when they “go to the store and see that prices are higher”, they
“feel a little angry at someone”, the most commonly perceived culprits including “manufacturers”,
“store owners”, and “businesses”, and the most commonly identified cause being “greed”.
Our model reconciles the nonneutrality of money with the evidence presented by Shiller: con-
sumers feel cheated by higher prices after an increase in money supply because they believe that
higher prices reflect higher markups. Hence, the model helps bridge the gap between the atti-
tudes that people have about inflation and those implied by macroeconomic models. Romer [2001,
p.519] describes this gap as follows: “Inflation’s costs are not well understood. There is a wide
gap between the popular view of inflation and the costs of inflation that economist can identify.
Inflation is intensely disliked.”
The preferences in our model share features with those used in the literature on reciprocity and
fairness in that consumers care not only about the quantities that they consume but also about the
1These frictions take many different forms. Classical frictions include staggered nominal contracts as in Akerlof
[1969], Fischer [1977], and Taylor [1979], a quadratic price-adjustment cost as in Rotemberg [1982], infrequent
pricing as in Calvo [1983], and a menu cost as in Mankiw [1985] and Akerlof and Yellen [1985]. Blanchard [1990]
surveys early theories of the nonneutrality of money; Mankiw and Reis [2010] and Sims [2010] survey recent theories.
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surpluses enjoyed by firms.2 Akerlof [1982] and Akerlof and Yellen [1990] pioneered the study of
the implications of fairness on the labor market, showing how unemployment arises when fairness
considerations affect employment relations. Rotemberg [2005] initiated the product-market side of
this agenda. Building on a large amount of empirical evidence, Rotemberg assumes that consumers
care about firms’ altruism—their taste for increasing consumers’ payoffs—which they re-evaluate
after every price change. Consumers buy a normal amount from the firm unless they can reject the
hypothesis that the firm is altruistic toward them, in which case they withhold all demand to lower
the firm’s profits. Given such discontinuity, firms react by refraining from passing on small cost
increases, leading to money nonneutrality.
In this paper, we retool the psychological assumption of Rotemberg [2005] that consumers
refuse to purchase from firms whose prices reveal a lack of concern for their welfare by assuming
that consumers experience less enjoyment of a good the less fair they regard its price. Despite broad
similarities, the two assumptions differ conceptually and have different predictions. Unlike ours,
Rotemberg’s assumption implies that consumers would not withhold demand unless doing so hurt
firms. Yet in many large market settings, consumers cannot easily cause firms significant harm.3
In monopolistically competitive markets, consumers can reduce profits by withholding demand,
but the effect is likely to be small in large markets. Rotemberg [2005] bypasses this difficulty by
assuming that consumers’ taste for harming non-altruistic firms is arbitrarily strong.
In our formulation, consumers do not discontinuously withhold demand to punish firms but do
so smoothly because they enjoy consuming unfairly-priced goods less. This allows us to move
away from Rotemberg’s binary buy-normally-or-buy-nothing formulation to one in which con-
sumers continuously reduce demand as the unfairness of the transaction or their concern for fair-
ness increases. This continuous formulation is more tractable: it lends itself to comparative-statics
analysis, welfare analysis, and delivers analytical expressions for key elasticities. It has important
macroeconomic effects even when consumers care much more about consumption than fairness.
Last, it enables us to introduce fairness while modifying only minimally the Blanchard-Kiyotaki
model—we only add one parameter, φ , to measure people’s concern for fairness.
2See for instance the preferences of Rabin [1993], which embed intention-based fairness concerns, or the social
preferences of Fehr and Schmidt [1999], which exhibit aversion to unequal outcomes.
3In fact Dufwenberg et al. [2011] show that under perfect competition, consumers with standard other-regarding
preferences are observationally equivalent to those who care only for their own consumption: withholding a unit of
demand does not harm a seller who earns zero profit on the marginal unit.
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2 Motivation for the Fairness and Cursedness Assumptions
In this section we provide empirical evidence that people care about the fairness of the markup
charged by firms and that firms respond to such preferences. We then briefly summarize evidence
in support of our assumption that people fail to infer firms’ marginal costs from equilibrium prices.4
2.1 Fairness Matters for Consumers
Consumers care about the fairness of prices. The idea that they express hostility to price increases
not explained by cost increases goes back at least to Okun [1981], who points out that “price
increases that are based on cost increases are fair, while those based on demand increases often are
viewed as unfair”. In a seminal study based on survey data, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986]
explore people’s attitude towards the fairness of prices. The responses to their survey establish a
pattern wherein consumers deem it fair for firms to raise prices in response to increases in marginal
costs but not in response to increases in demand. By assuming that people dislike paying above a
fair markup on marginal cost, our model incorporates this finding.
In our model, we assume that consumers react angrily to a price increase that follows a demand
increase and therefore involves an increase in markup. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986]
establish such a pattern. For example, they describe following situation: “A hardware store has
been selling snow shovels for $15. The morning after a large snowstorm, the store raises the price
to $20.” Only 18% of consumers regard this pricing behavior as acceptable. 82% regard this
behavior as unfair.
In our model, consumers do not mind a price increase that follows a cost increase as long as
the markup remains constant. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986] indeed find this, for instance
in response to the following situation: “Suppose that, due to a transportation mixup, there is a
local shortage of lettuce and the wholesale price has increased. A local grocer has bought the
usual quantity of lettuce at a price that is 30 cents per head higher than normal. The grocer raises
the price of lettuce to customers by 30 cents per head.” 79% of consumers regard the grocer’s
behavior as acceptable, and only 21% find it unfair.5 We also assume that consumers regard it
4See Rotemberg [2009] for a survey of the behavioral reactions of consumers to prices and the implications of
these reactions for price setting by firms and for government policy.
5In this question, the additive markup does not vary across situations, yet, in our model, fairness perceptions depend
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as unfair for firms not to pass along cost decreases despite the evidence that Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler [1986] find for this being weaker.6 For simplicity, and also because we expect that
consumers would insist that cost savings be passed along in the long-run, we do not incorporate
an asymmetry between consumers’ reactions to cost increases and decreases. Doing so would
not affect our results on surprise increases in money supply but would affect our results regarding
decreases in money supply or increases in technology. Nevertheless, we would obtain the same
qualitative results, albeit quantitatively muted, if only a fraction of consumers contest that cost
savings must be passed on.
The findings of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986] have been confirmed in many studies,
especially using laboratory experiments. For instance, Campbell [1999] provides evidence that
consumers’ inferences about the motives behind price increases influence how fair they judge the
increase. Renner and Tyran [2004] provides additional evidence that price rigidity after a tempo-
rary cost shock is much more pronounced if price increases cannot be justified by cost increases.
2.2 Firms Understand that Fairness Matters for Consumers
The predictions of our model depend not only on the assumption that consumers respond to unfair
markups but also on the assumption that firms understand how consumers trim demand at unfair
prices. Blinder et al. [1998] find evidence that they do. 64% of firms say that customers do not
tolerate price increases after increases in demand; 71% of firms say that customers do tolerate price
increase after increase in cost. These responses suggest that the norm for fair pricing must take the
form of a fair markup over marginal cost. Indeed, based on a survey of businessmen in the UK,
Hall and Hitch [1939] report that the fair price is widely perceived to be a markup over average
cost. Okun [1975] also observed by discussing with business people that “empirically, the typical
standard of fairness involves cost-oriented pricing with a markup”.
Moreover, ample evidence suggests that consumers’ concern for fairness influences how firms
set prices. Following Blinder et al. [1998], researchers have surveyed firms about their pricing
upon proportional markups. We suspect that Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986] would have obtained the same
results had they asked whether it is fair for firms to increase prices by x% following cost increases of x%.
6For example, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986] describe the following situation: “A small factory produces
tables and sells all that it can make at $200 each. Because of changes in the price of materials, the cost of making each
table has recently decreased by $20. The factory does not change its price of tables.” 53% of respondents find this fair,
even though the markup has increased.
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Table 1: The Prevalence of Implicit Contracts with Customers (“Firms tacitly agree to stabilize
prices, perhaps out of fairness to customers”)
Ranking of
Study Country Period Sample implicit contracts
Blinder et al. [1998] US 1990–92 200 4/12
Hall, Walsh and Yates [2000] UK 1995 654 5/11
Amirault, Kwan and Wilkinson [2006] Canada 2002–03 170 2/11
Apel, Friberg and Hallsten [2005] Sweden 2000 626 1/13
Kwapil, Baumgartner and Scharler [2005] Austria 2004 873 1/10
Aucremanne and Druant [2005] Belgium 2004 1,979 1/15
Loupias and Ricart [2004] France 2004 1,662 4/10
Lunnemann and Matha [2006] Luxembourg 2004 367 1/15
Hoeberichts and Stokman [2006] Netherlands 2004 1,246 1/8
Martins [2005] Portugal 2004 1,370 1/12
Alvarez and Hernando [2005] Spain 2004 2,008 1/9
Notes: Respondents to the surveys rated the relevance of each of a set of price-setting theories for price stickiness in
their own firms. This table shows how the theory of implicit contracts ranks amongst the alternatives: a rank of 4/12
means that it was the 4th most popular of 12 proposed theories.
strategies. In these surveys, managers tasked with setting prices were presented with economic
theories of price setting and asked to rate the importance of each as a cause of their own firm’s price
stickiness.7 Although the surveys do not explicitly include our theory, they do report on a closely
related theory that they call “implicit contracts” and describe as follows: “firms tacitly agree to
stabilize prices, perhaps out of fairness to customers.” This theory receives abundant support from
firms, as shown in Table 1: while no theory clearly dominates the surveys, such a fairness theory
always finishes amongst the most relevant ones. Firms appear to incorporate fairness concerns into
their price setting.
In Appendix B, we report our own interviews of French bakers on their price-setting practices,
as well as historical evidence of the role that fairness considerations played in French history.
These provide further evidence that firms recognize that consumers care about markups.
7Table 5.1 in Blinder et al. [1998] summarizes the most commonly proposed theories. Amongst the ten or so
theories included in these surveys are three leading macroeconomic theories of price rigidity—menu costs, nominal
contracts, and informational frictions. While a useful modeling device, the infrequent pricing of Calvo [1983] does
not provide a theory of price rigidity and therefore could not be evaluated. The other theories included IO theories of
price rigidity, such as coordination failure and quality signaling.
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2.3 Firms Attempt to Communicate their Costs to Consumers
Last, our assumption that buyers care not only about consumption but also about sellers’ markups
has implications for the type of cost information that firms wish to transmit to consumers. Firms
with high marginal costs wish to reveal them to consumers whose estimates are too low. Firms with
low marginal costs wish to conceal them from consumers whose estimates are too high. Ample
evidence suggests that firms do indeed try to explain and thus to justify price increases caused by
increases in costs. In their detailed study of the pricing process of a large industrial firm, Zbaracki
et al. [2004] find that it expends substantial resources communicating and justifying price increases
to customers. The observation that firms attempt to rationalize their prices rises dates at least as far
back as Okun [1975], who noted that firms aim to “justify cost-oriented price increases—a desire
evident in the dedicated, if fuzzy, statements that firms issue, insisting that higher costs force them
to raise prices”.
Our own observations suggest that these statement are indeed prevalent, as showed in the pic-
tures of Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1(b) is particularly interesting because it was taken on a Hawaiian
island without competing taquerias; hence, the firm did not post its sign to signal higher competi-
tor prices, something that firms have incentive to do when consumers face search costs. Figure 2
shows that producers go to great lengths to justify cost increases. It comprises two displays posted
side-by-side in a bakery in Ithaca, NY. The first explains that the increase in the price of wheat price
translated into an increase in the price of flour, a key ingredient for bagels. The second reproduces
graphs from the New York Times to substantiate the claim.
2.4 Fairness According to Religious and Legal Texts
Surveys of consumers, firms, and French bakers suggest that a norm of fair prices over marginal
costs is widespread today in the Western world. Religious and legal texts written over the ages
suggest that it corresponds to a general principle of fairness.
Religious texts provide evidence that norms of fair pricing have existed for a long time, and that
the fair price often is a fair markup over cost of production or purchase for resale. For example,
Talmudic law (Mishnah, Gemarah) states that there is a maximum percentage markup over cost
that is fair and acceptable and should be allowed in trade [Wahrhaftig, 1999]. In particular, it
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(a) Sandwich Shop in Columbus, OH, 2008 (Photo: Slav Petrov) (b) Taqueria in Kona, HI, 2008
(Photo: Pascal Michaillat)
Figure 1: Examples of Firms Justifying a Price Increase by a Cost Increase
posits that a good cannot be sold at a markup higher than 20% over the cost of producing the
good—1/6 of the final price.8 If the price deviates by more, the buyer is entitled to a refund.
Norms of fair pricing appear not only in religious but also in legal texts. For instance, during
most of the 18th century in France, bread prices were fixed by local authorities. The police, sup-
ported by the Parliament, would determine a price of bread that would be “fair” for bakers and
consumers; this fair price would be announced in an official decree. For example, in the city of
Rouen, bread-price schedules would take into account the price of grain, costs of rent, milling,
wood and labor, and grant a “modest profit” to the baker [Miller, 1999]. The schedule was decreed
by the policy, and could be adjusted with large fluctuations in the price of grain. The entire price-
cap map could be revised if the grain prices were too high during a dearth: bakers could petition
to have the price cap increased. Price caps could also be lowered, thus reducing the price of bread.
Police officers would patrol the marketplace to enforce the price caps.
8See the statement of Shmuel, page 49b of Bava Metzhia, Nezikin, halakhah.com/pdf/nezikin/Baba Metzia.pdf.
The 20% rule also applies to middlemen, so that someone who sells an item previously purchased from producer can
charge an additional 20% to compensate for the effort of selling.
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February 28, 2008 
TO OUR VALUED CUSTOMERS 
Wheat is continuing to hit record prices, vastly increasing our costs 
for flour. To cope with this, we are forced to impose a surcharge on 
bread and bagels, effective immediately. This will include sandwiches. 
Each week, we will recalculate the surcharge, according to the price of 
wheat. We hope that this will be temporary, but industry experts do not 
know when—or if—prices will stabilize. 
• Our flour cost has more than tripled in the past month. 
• On Monday (2/25/08) the price of March spring wheat on the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange hit $24 a bushel, double its cost 
two months ago and the highest price ever for wheat. 
• The high-quality wheat we use to make artisan breads and 
bagels is getting harder to find. 
• U.S. stocks of wheat are now at their lowest level in 60 
years. 
We can direct customers to substantial references for information about 
the wheat situation, online and in print. 
When prices return to normal, we will drop the surcharge. Please bear 
with us as we try to address this very serious situation. 
Sincerely, 
The Brous & Mehaffey Family 
(a) Justification for higher prices
• •• % 
I l l FOR THE NEW VORKTMRS 
Crop Prices Are Soaring 
The agricultural commodities that go into processed 
food are becoming more expensive, contributing to 
higher prices at the grocery store. 
Commodity prices 
Generic near-month futures 
contract price per bushel. 
Charts are plotted on comparable 
percentage-change scales. 
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(b) Evidence of higher costs
Figure 2: Another Example, from a Bakery in Ithaca, NY, 2008 (Photo: Daniel Benjamin)
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2.5 Evidence of Cursed Inference
It is well documented that people fail to infer other people’s information from their actions. In-
deed, numerous experimental studies show that people underinfer other people’s information from
their actions. Samuelson and Bazerman [1985], Holt and Sherman [1994], and Carillo and Pal-
frey [2011], among others, provide evidence in the context of bilateral bargaining with asymmet-
ric information that bargainers underappreciate adverse selection in trade. The papers collected
in Kagel and Levin [2002] present evidence that bidders underattend to the “winner’s curse” in
common-value auctions. In a metastudy of social-learning experiments, Weizsa¨cker [2010] finds
evidence that subjects behave as if they underinfer their predecessors’ private information from
their actions. Last, in an elegant voting experiment, Esponda and Vespa [2014] show that subjects
underinfer others’ private information from their votes, succumbing to a “swing voter’s curse”.
3 The Model
We extend the Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] model to include fairness concerns on the goods
market. The economy is composed of a continuum of firms indexed by i ∈ [0,1] and a continuum
of households indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Firms produce goods that are imperfect substitutes for each
other, and households supply labor services that are also imperfect substitutes. As a result, each
firm has some monopoly power on the goods market, and each household has some monopoly
power on the labor market.
3.1 Households and Firms
Household j derives utility from leisure, consumption of goods, and money holdings. Fairness
matters on the goods market. Specifically, an amount ci j of good i bought at a unit price of Pi when
the perceived marginal cost of production is MCi yields the fairness-adjusted consumption
zi j = ψi · ci j,
where the fairness factor ψi is a function of the fair markup µ fi ≥ 0 and the perceived markup
µ pi ≡ Pi/MCi. Whereas the perceived markups are endogenous variables determined by prices
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and households’ inferences about marginal costs, the fair markups are parameters of the model.
For concreteness, we assume that all households care about fairness in the same way and that the
fairness factor takes the form
ψi = 1− φµ p ·
(
µ pi −µ fi
)
.
The deviation µ pi −µ fi of the perceived markup from the fair markup is scaled by φ/µ p, where φ ∈
[0,1] is the fairness parameter and µ p≡ ∫ 10 µ pi di is the average perceived markup across all goods.9
The fairness parameter indicates the importance of fairness concerns: when φ = 0, consumers do
not care about fairness; as φ > 0, they care about the perceived fairness of the transaction. A higher
φ means that a consumer is more upset when consuming an overpriced item and more content when
consuming an underpriced item. We divide φ by µ p as a normalization.
The fairness factor is one when consumers do not care about fairness or when they perceive
good i to be priced at its fair markup. When consumers perceive good i to be priced above its
fair markup—that is, when Pi > µ fi ·MCi—the fairness factor is below one, and consumers are
antagonized by consuming what they perceive to be an overpriced good. It is as if consumers lost
the fraction 1−ψi > 0 of each unit of consumption of good i bought at an unfair price, which will
reduce their marginal utility of its consumption. Analogously, when consumers perceive good i to
be priced below its fair markup, they enjoy heightened utility from consuming what they perceive
to be an underpriced good. As the fairness factor depends only on markups, consumers evaluate
fairness in real rather than nominal terms. Finally, the fairness factor is differentiable everywhere
in Pi and does not exhibit a kink at the fair price. In fact, the fairness factor is linear in Pi, so
consumers enjoy a price any amount below the fair price as much as they dislike a price that same
amount above the fair price.10
Household j’s fairness-adjusted consumption of the different goods are aggregated into a con-
9We focus on situations where perceived markups satisfy µ pi ≤ µ fi +µ p/φ so the fairness factor remains positive.
These conditions are always satisfied in a symmetric equilibrium.
10Although this assumption does not allow consumers to be more sensitive to prices above the fair price than to
prices below the fair price, as the work of Tversky and Kahneman [1991] on loss aversion might suggest, it greatly
simplifies the model.
14
sumption index
z j ≡
(∫ 1
0
z
ε−1
ε
i j di
) ε
ε−1
,
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different goods, which we assume to be
common to all households. This functional form captures consumers’ love of variety; as ε → ∞,
goods become perfect substitutes.
The utility of household j is given by
u j = ln(z j)+
1
η
· ln
(
M j
Pˆ
)
−ν · 1
1+ξ
·h1+ξj . (1)
The utility depends on the fairness-adjusted consumption index, z j, the number of hours worked,
h j, and the ratio of nominal money balances M j to the fairness-adjusted price index
Pˆ≡
[∫ 1
0
(
Pi
ψi
)1−ε
di
] 1
1−ε
.
As we will see, Pˆ is the price of one unit of z j. Hence, M j/Pˆ indicates the number of units of z j
that can be purchased with M j. Since it is z j that enters the utility function, M j/Pˆ indicates the
value of the transaction services provided by the nominal money balances held by household j. It
is therefore natural to divide M j by Pˆ in the utility function. The parameters η > 0, ν > 0, and
ξ > 0 measure households’ common propensity to spend money out of income, the level of the
disutility from labor, and the curvature of the disutility from labor, respectively.
Household j maximizes utility subject to the constraint imposed by firms’ demand for labor
service j and the budget constraint
M0 j +Wj ·h j +Π j−M j−
∫ 1
0
Pi · ci jdi = 0, (2)
where M0 j > 0 is its endowment of money supply, Wj is its nominal hourly wage, and Π j is its
share of nominal profits. Households take prices, profits, and money supply as given.
Firm i hires labor to produce output using the constant-elasticity-of-substitution production
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function
ci = ai ·hαi , (3)
where ci is its output of good i, ai is its technology level, α < 1 is the extent of diminishing
marginal returns to labor, and
hi ≡
(∫ 1
0
h
γ−1
γ
i j d j
) γ
γ−1
is an employment index. In the employment index, hi j is the number of hours of labor service j
hired by firm i, and γ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different labor services. The
parameters γ and α apply to all firms.
Taking wages as given, firm i maximize profits
Πi = Pi · ci−
∫ 1
0
Wj ·hi jd j (4)
subject to the constraints imposed by its production function and consumers’ demand for good i.
We assume that firms’ marginal costs are unobservable to other firms and consumers—they are pri-
vate information—and that firms are not strategic: firm i does not attempt to influence consumers’
beliefs about its marginal cost MCi by choosing a price Pi.11 Formally, firm i takes the demand
for good i as given, which means that it takes MCi as independent of Pi in consumers’ fairness
factor ψi = 1− (φ/µ p) · (Pi/MCi− µ fi ). This assumption has no consequence when consumers
do not care about fairness, since consumers then have no interest in marginal cost. It also has no
consequence when consumers make cursed inferences (as in Section 5), because firms could not
successfully signal any information about costs. It matters when consumers care about fairness
and are rational (in Section 4), because in that case there may exist other equilibria where firms
signal their marginal costs. Since that is not the main focus of our paper, we do not delve into these
signaling equilibria.
11When all firms share the same technology, as we later shall assume, this assumption becomes unnecessary. Nev-
ertheless, we assume non-strategic firms throughout to ease exposition.
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3.2 Solution to the Households’ and Firms’ Problems
To maximize their utility, households make two decisions: first, they choose how to divide their
wealth across goods and money balances; second, they choose which wage to post for their labor
services. Integrating the demand for good i over all households yields the demand for good i:
cdi (Pi) =
z
ψi
·
(
Pi/ψi
Pˆ
)−ε
, (5)
where z≡ ∫ 10 z jd j describes the level of aggregate demand. The price of a unit of zi is Pi/ψi so the
ratio (Pi/ψi)/Pˆ is the relative price of zi. Demand for good i increases with aggregate demand but
decreases with its relative price. In addition, household j equates the marginal rate of substitution
between money and fairness-adjusted consumption with their price ratio, which gives an equation
linking fairness-adjusted consumption to nominal money balances:
z j
ηM j
=
1
Pˆ
. (6)
Households choose which wage to post given firms’ demand for their labor
hdj (Wj) = h ·
(
Wj
W
)−γ
, (7)
where W ≡
(∫ 1
0 W
1−γ
j d j
) 1
1−γ is the nominal wage index, and h ≡ ∫ 10 hidi describes the level of
employment in the economy. The labor demand faced by household j increases with the level of
employment in the economy but decreases with the relative wage Wj/W set by the household. To
maximize utility, household j sets its wage at a markup of γ/(γ−1)> 1 over its marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and money holdings:
Wj =
γ
γ−1 ·ν ·h
ξ
j ·η ·M j. (8)
To maximize profits, firms also make two decisions: first, they choose how much of each type
of labor to hire ; second, they choose which price to post for their good. Integrating the demand
for labor j over all firms yields the labor demand (7). It is optimal for firm i to mark its price up
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over its marginal cost by setting
Pi =
ei
ei−1 ·
W
ai ·α ·hα−1i
. (9)
The markup is ei/(ei− 1) > 1, where ei ≡ −(Pi/ci) · (dcdi /dPi) is the price-elasticity of firm i’s
demand, normalized to be positive. We use (5) to compute ei:
ei = ε+(ε−1) · eψi , (10)
where eψi ≡ −(Pi/ψi) · (dψi/dPi) is the price-elasticity of the fairness factor ψi = 1− (φ/µ p) ·
(Pi/MCi−µ fi ), normalized to be positive. We have
eψi =
φ
µ p
· µ
p
i
ψi
. (11)
Fairness concerns modify two properties of the price-elasticity ei of firm i’s demand, and these
modifications have important implications. First, without fairness concerns, the price-elasticity of
the demand faced by firms is ε , the elasticity of substitution across goods. Indeed, setting φ = 0 in
(11) and (10) yields eψi = 0 and ei = ε . But the introduction of fairness concerns makes households
more sensitive to prices, which increases the price-elasticity of the demand faced by firms and thus
reduces firms’ monopoly power. Indeed, with φ > 0, we have eψi > 0 so ei > ε . Intuitively, with
fairness concerns, an increase in the price of good i increases the opportunity cost of consumption,
as without fairness concerns, but it also decreases the enjoyment of consumption by increasing the
perceived markup, thus reducing further the demand for good i.
Second, without fairness concerns, the price-elasticity of the demand faced by firms is con-
stant. But with fairness concerns, households’ perceptions of markups affect the price-elasticity
of the demand faced by firms. In fact, the introduction of fairness concerns implies that the price-
elasticity of the demand faced by firms is not constant but increasing with the perceived markup.
Indeed, as the perceived markup µ pi increases, the fairness factor ψi falls, so e
ψ
i increases by (11)
and thus ei increases by (10).12
12This property that eψi increases with µ
p
i is robust. It would hold for any function ψi that is decreasing and concave
in Pi (our function ψi is decreasing and linear in Pi). That is, it would hold for any function ψi such that households
enjoy a price any amount below the fair price less than they dislike a price that same amount above the fair price.
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3.3 General Equilibrium
We describe the general equilibrium. We focus on a symmetric setting. All households regard
the same markup as fair for all goods; all households receive the same endowment of money and
profits; and all firms share a common technology. Nevertheless, we assume that households do
not know that they are symmetric: each household correctly believes that its money endowment is
uncorrelated with the aggregate endowment, and we study only realizations where all households
receive the same money. In equilibrium, all households post the same wage and all firms set the
same price. Since the equilibrium is symmetric, all the exogenous and endogenous variables are
the same for all the households and firms; we drop the subscripts i and j from all the variables to
denote their value in the symmetric equilibrium. All the derivations are relegated to Appendix A.
We condense the symmetric general equilibrium to a pair (P,h), from which all other variables
can be recovered. Here we derive the two equations that determine (P,h).
In a symmetric equilibrium, z=ψ ·c, Pˆ= P/ψ , and M =M0. Combining the marginal-rate-of-
substitution condition (6) with the production constraint (3) gives the first equation characterizing
the general equilibrium:
ln(P) = ln(M0)+ ln(η)− ln(a)−α · ln(h). (12)
This equation expresses the price level as a decreasing function of hours worked. The intuition is
that higher hours worked lead to more output and thus a lower marginal utility from consumption.
Since, in equilibrium, households must remain indifferent between consumption and money hold-
ings, real money balances M0/P must increase to lower the marginal utility from holding money.
As the money supply is fixed to M0, the price level P must fall.
Combining (12) with households’ wage-setting equation, given by (8), we express the real
wage W/P as an increasing function of hours worked:
ln
(
W
P
)
= (ξ +α) · ln(h)+ ln(a)+ ln(ν)+ ln
(
γ
γ−1
)
. (13)
The real wage increases with hours worked because the disutility from labor is convex and the util-
ity from consumption concave. Firms’ real marginal cost is the real wage divided by the marginal
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product of labor:
mc =
W/P
a ·α ·hα−1 .
Using (13), we express the real marginal cost as an increasing function of hours worked:
ln(mc) = (1+ξ ) · ln(h)+ ln(ν)− ln(α)+ ln
(
γ
γ−1
)
.
The real marginal cost increases with hours worked because the real wage increases with hours
and the production function has diminishing marginal returns to labor.
Firms’ price-setting equation, given by (9), implies that the markup set by firms is the inverse
of the real marginal cost:
µ =
1
mc
,
This is a typical property in models of monopolistic competition. Equation (9) also shows that the
markup is e/(e− 1) where e = ε +(ε − 1) · (φ/ψ) is the price-elasticity of the demand faced by
firms, obtained from (10) and (11). Hence, when the markup perceived by households is µ p, the
markup set by firms is
µ(µ p) =
1
ε−1 ·
(
ε− φ
1+φ ·µ f /µ p
)
. (14)
The following lemma describes how the markup set by firms depends upon fairness concerns and
µ p. Figure 3 illustrates the results of the lemma.
LEMMA 1. When households do not care about fairness (φ = 0), the markup µ(µ p) coincides
with the standard monopolistic markup of ε/(ε−1). When households care about fairness (φ > 0),
the markup µ(µ p) lies below the standard monopolistic markup of ε/(ε−1), decreases in φ , and
is bounded from below above one. Furthermore, it reverts to ε/(ε−1) when µ p = 0, decreases in
µ p, and converges to (ε−φ)/(ε−1)≥ 1 as µ p→+∞.
Combining the results on the real marginal cost and markup, we express hours worked as a
20
✏✏  1
0
0
µ
µp
µ⇤
✏   
✏  1
µ(µp)
µ = µp
Figure 3: Relation Between the Perceived Markup and the Markup Set by Firms
Notes: This graph represents the markup µ(µ p) set by monopolistic firms to maximize profits when the markup
perceived by households is µ p. The properties of the function µ(µ p) are described in Lemma 1.
decreasing function of the markup:
(1+ξ ) · ln(h) =− ln(µ(µ p))+ ln(α)− ln(ν)− ln
(
γ
γ−1
)
, (15)
which is the second equation characterizing the general equilibrium.
4 The Case with Rational Inference
In this section, we analyze the economy when households rationally infer firms’ marginal costs.
The following proposition summarizes the properties of the equilibrium:
PROPOSITION 1. Consider an economy in which households make rational inferences. The
markup is the fixed point µ∗ of the function µ(µ p), which satisfies
µ(µ∗) = µ∗ =
ε
ε−1 −
φ
ε−1 ·
1
1+φ ·µ f /µ∗ .
An increase in the fairness parameter φ renders the economy more competitive: the markup de-
creases in φ ; output, hours, and real wages increase in φ ; prices decrease in φ , as do real profits
when µ < 1+α . Importantly, the markup is independent of money supply and technology. Hence,
money-supply and technology shocks have the following effects:
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Figure 4: The General Equilibrium with Rational Inference
• Money is neutral: the money supply has no effect on hours, output, real wage, or real profits;
the price level is proportional to the money supply.
• Technology influences quantities and prices: output, real wage, and real profits are pro-
portional to technology; the price level is inversely proportional to technology; hours are
independent of technology.
The proof of this proposition and the other in the paper are relegated to Appendix A. The main
result of this proposition is that when households make rational inferences, money is neutral: hours
and output do not depend on the money supply. In the case where people do not care about fairness
(φ = 0), this result replicates the famous finding of Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] that money is
neutral in an economy with monopolistic competition. The proposition shows that the neutrality
result also holds when people care about fairness (φ > 0).
The intuition for the neutrality of money goes as follows. Since the markup is independent of
money supply and technology and determines the real marginal cost, hours worked are indepen-
dent of money supply and technology. All the other properties follow from this result, which is
illustrated in Figure 4. The equilibrium pair (ln(h), ln(P)) lies at the intersection of the two curves.
Because the vertical curve is independent of money supply and technology, it determines h irre-
spective of the downward-sloping curve. Thus, prices absorb the money-supply and technology
shocks, which do not influence hours worked.
When households are rational, fairness concerns simply increase the elasticity of demand. Fair-
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ness concerns affect the general equilibrium only by rendering the demand schedules faced by mo-
nopolists more price-elastic, leading to reduced markups. Since monopolistic competition gives
rise to inefficiently low production because firms price in excess of marginal costs, fairness con-
cerns, by increasing the elasticity of demand and reducing the markup, improve efficiency. Greater
efficiency means higher output, more hours worked, higher real wages, and higher real money
balances—or, equivalently, a lower price level. In fact, there is an isomorphism between the mod-
els with and without fairness concerns: for each φ > 0 and ε > 1, the equilibrium coincides with
the equilibrium of another economy with φ = 0 for some ε ′ > ε . The effect on real profits depends
on parameter values. Macroeconomists conventionally estimate µ to be between 1.05 and 1.3, and
α between 0.66 and 1, in which case µ < 1+α , so that fairness concerns decrease profits.
Although the proposition only describes money-supply and technology shocks, it is possible to
study other types of shocks. For instance, we could study the effects of an aggregate-demand shock
parametrized by a change in the preference parameter η . An increase in η lowers the marginal util-
ity of money balances, pushing households to consume more of the produced goods; it therefore
can be interpreted as a positive aggregate-demand shock. Since M0 and η enter exactly similarly in
all the equilibrium conditions, increasing η has exactly the same effects as increasing M0. There-
fore, even if households care about fairness, aggregate demand is neutral when households make
rational inferences. Likewise, we could study the effects of a labor-supply shock parameterized by
a change in the preference parameter ν .
5 The Case with Cursed Inference
Although households see and use prices when purchasing goods, they may fail to infer the extent to
which differences in prices convey information about differences in marginal costs. Whereas prices
are salient, their equilibrium relationship to marginal cost is not. In equilibrium, households could
also further update about firms’ marginal costs using received profits and labor demand, but they
may neglect this sort of indirect information. The evidence in Section 2.5 suggests that people fail
at precisely this type of inference. Accordingly, in this section we assume that households neglect
the information that these variables provide about marginal costs. The structure of the inference
mistake that we assume, which we call cursed inference, is very closely related to the solution con-
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cept of cursed equilibrium by Eyster and Rabin [2005] and analogy-based expectation equilibrium
by Jehiel [2005] and Jehiel and Koessler [2008].13 Of course, without fairness concerns (φ = 0),
inference about marginal costs plays no role, so the equilibrium with cursed inference is exactly
the same as the equilibrium with rational inference. Hence, this section considers only on the case
with fairness concerns (φ > 0), in which cursed inference plays a critical role.
5.1 Cursed Inference
Household j seeks to maximize the expectation of the utility u j, given by (1), subject to its known
budget constraint, given by (2). In this constrained optimization problem, the household knows ev-
erything except for the MCi terms that enter the fairness factors, ψi = 1−(φ/µ p) ·
(
Pi/MCi−µ fi
)
.
Rational households would use their understanding of firms’ pricing rules as well as their obser-
vations to infer these marginal costs. By contrast, cursed households take expectations of u j given
their prior beliefs over MCi (which can be derived from prior beliefs over {ai} and M0).14
To simplify, we assume that households’ priors about nominal marginal costs are highly con-
centrated around a nominal value MC so that we can replace households’ expected utility with
their utility given a marginal cost MC.15 As a consequence, all of our comparative statics describe
reactions to surprise shocks, namely cost realizations assigned low prior probability. Overall, we
find that introducing cursedness has important implications, notably causing money nonneutrality.
5.2 Characterization of the Cursed General Equilibrium
The key effect of cursed inference is that the equilibrium markup is no longer independent of the
price level. A higher price causes households to perceive a higher markup, which in turn increases
the elasticity of demand and reduces the markup charged by firms. Specifically, the markup is
13We cannot apply any of these concepts exactly for two reasons. First, we study a market equilibrium, whereas
cursed equilibrium and analogy-based-expectations equilibrium are game-theoretic concepts. Second, as emphasized
in Eyster and Rabin [2005], these solution concepts all create artificial distinctions between exogenous versus en-
dogenous variables, assuming either that people fail to appreciate the relationship between endogenous variables and
exogenous variables, or that they fail to appreciate the relationship between endogenous variables and other endoge-
nous variables, but not both. Our assumption comprises both.
14A richer model would include some rational households who infer marginal costs from prices and some house-
holds who do not. We suspect but have not proven that this sort of mixture model would deliver the same qualitative
results as ours, most likely with muted effects.
15We expect but have not proven that none of the qualitative results depend upon this simplifying assumption.
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Figure 5: The General Equilibrium with Fairness Concerns and Cursed Inference
given by µ(P/MC), where the function µ(µ p) is given by (14).
Figure 5 illustrates how equation (15) is no longer independent of the price level. Instead, it
gives rise to an increasing relationship between the price level and hours. Furthermore, this curve
has two closed-form asymptotes:
lim
ln(P)→−∞
ln(h) =
1
1+ξ
·
[
ln(α)− ln(ν)− ln
(
γ
γ−1
)
− ln
(
ε
ε−1
)]
,
lim
ln(P)→+∞
ln(h) =
1
1+ξ
·
[
ln(α)− ln(ν)− ln
(
γ
γ−1
)
− ln
(
ε−φ
ε−1
)]
.
These establish the existence and uniqueness of general equilibrium.
Because money-supply and technology shocks shift only the downward-sloping curve, using
Figure 5 it is straightforward to analyze how the equilibrium changes with the shocks, which we
do in the next two subsections.
5.3 Money-Supply Shocks
The following proposition compares an equilibrium with a low realization of money supply to one
with a high realization of money supply:
PROPOSITION 2. Consider an economy in which households care about fairness (φ > 0) and
make cursed inferences. Money is not neutral. An increase in money supply has the following
effects: the markup decreases; hours worked, output, and real wage increase; real profits de-
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Figure 6: Comparative Statics with Fairness Concerns and Cursed Inference
crease when µ < 1+α; the price level increases less than proportionally to the money supply;
even though the actual markup decreases, the perceived markup increases and the fairness factor
decreases.
Under the joint assumptions of fairness concerns and cursed inference, money is no longer neu-
tral. Instead, we find that an increase in money supply causes monopolistic markups to fall, stim-
ulating the economy. After an increase in money supply, households misattribute the higher prices
to higher markups. The misperception of higher markups angers consumer and increases the elas-
ticity of the demand curves faced by monopolists; in response, monopolists reduce their markups.
This result is formally established by Lemma 1, which shows that the equilibrium markup is a de-
creasing function of the perceived markup. We know that in a symmetric general equilibrium the
markup is equal to the inverse of the real marginal cost and the real marginal cost is an increasing
function of hours worked. Therefore, a lower markup implies higher real marginal cost and thus
higher hours worked, which in turn implies higher output.
The nonneutrality result is illustrated in Figure 6(a). A high realization of money supply raises
the downward-sloping curve; therefore, hours worked are higher in equilibrium. The price level is
also higher.
Unlike in traditional monetary models, the nonneutrality of money happens without any con-
straint on price setting. In our model, there is no long-term nominal contracting, price-adjustment
cost, or staggered pricing. Instead, it is firms’ optimal price setting in the presence of consumers
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concerned about fairness and making cursed inferences that leads to the nonneutrality of money.
With fairness concerns and cursed inference, the economy exhibits a form of price rigidity in
that the price level always moves less than the money supply. To understand why the price level
is necessarily rigid, suppose that starting from equilibrium the money supply M0 and the price
level P were to double. In this hypothetical equilibrium with price flexibility, M0/P would remain
the same, so output (through households’ indifference between consumption and money holdings)
and hours worked (through firms’ production function) would remain the same. Accordingly, the
real marginal cost faced by firms and thus the markup would not change (in general equilibrium,
the real marginal cost is an increasing function of hours worked and the markup is the inverse of
the real marginal cost). But observing higher prices, households would fail to infer the increase
in the underlying nominal marginal costs and would mistakenly perceive higher markups, which
would increase the elasticity of demand, leading monopolistic firms to set lower markups. Hence,
the economy cannot be in equilibrium. Consequently, the price level rises less than proportionally
with money supply; increased real money balances lead to increased output and hours worked,
increased real marginal cost, and decreased markup.
Our model predicts the same response of the markup to money-supply shocks as many other
monetary models. For instance, New Keynesian models give rise to markups that are countercycli-
cal under monetary shocks because firms take time to adjust their prices. But unlike firms in these
models, which always desire the same markup, firms in our model optimally tailor their markups
to the money supply. In that respect, our model our model is closer to models of business-cycle
fluctuations based on endogenous markups [Stiglitz, 1984]. The closest ones generate cyclical
markups from cyclical variations in the elasticity of demand faced by monopolists, an idea that
dates back to Robinson [1932]. She predicts greater elasticity of demand for durables in expan-
sions than in recessions, leading to countercylical fluctuations in markups. Galı´ [1994] gives a
related model in which demand for consumption and investment goods have different elasticities;
since their relative shares of output vary systematically over the business cycle, aggregate markups
exhibit cyclical fluctuations. Other models generate cyclical markups through alternative mecha-
nisms. For example, Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] predict lower markups in good times due to
price wars among oligopolists when demand is high. Bils [1989] predicts low markups with high
demand when firms find it most profitable to expand their customer base.
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Although the response of the actual markup to money-supply shocks is the same in our model
as in many existing monetary models, the response of the perceived markup is sharply different. In
existing models, consumers correctly infer markups from prices, so they understand that, although
prices rise after an increase in money supply, markups fall. In our model, in contrast, the perceived
markup increases because cursed households fail to appreciate that firms have higher nominal
marginal costs due to higher money supply. Households mistakenly believe that transactions have
become less fair although firms enjoy lower per-unit real profits and generally lower total real
profits. Households’ misperception in our model accords well with the survey responses in Shiller
[1996], in which respondents report that when they “go to the store and see that prices are higher”,
they “feel a little angry” at the “greed” of “manufacturers”, “store owners”, and “businesses”.
While an increase in money supply raises perceived markups and angers households, it also lowers
markups and increases economic efficiency. We will return to the effect of these two opposing
forces on welfare in Section 5.6.
5.4 Technology Shocks
The following proposition compares an equilibrium with a low realization of technology to one
with a high realization of technology:
PROPOSITION 3. Consider an economy in which households care about fairness (φ > 0) and
make cursed inferences. An increase in technology has the following effects: the markup increases;
hours worked decrease; output increases, albeit less than proportionally to technology; the real
wage increases less than proportionally to technology and might decrease; real profits increase,
more than proportionally to technology when µ < 1+ α; the price level decreases less than
inversely proportionally to technology; even though the actual markup increases, the perceived
markup decreases and the fairness factor increases.
The main result from the proposition is that an increase in technology leads to higher output
but lower hours worked. The logic mirrors that following a monetary shock. After an increase
in technology, households fail to infer that lower prices reflect lower marginal costs. Hence, the
perceived markup and thus the elasticity of the demand curves faced by monopolists decrease.
The lower elasticity of demand leads monopolists to raise their markups. In general equilibrium,
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a higher markup implies a lower real marginal cost and this a lower number of hours worked.
Relative to the case without fairness concerns, the positive effect of the increase in technology on
output is diminished.
The result that hours worked fall after an increase in technology is illustrated in Figure 6(b).
A high realization of technology lowers the downward-sloping curve; therefore, hours worked are
lower in equilibrium. The price level is also lower.
The discrepancy between actual and perceived markups is the mirror image of that follow-
ing a positive monetary shock. Since cursed households fail to appreciate that firms have lower
marginal costs due to improved technology, the perceived markup decreases at the same time as
the actual markup increases. Households mistakenly believe that transactions have become more
fair although firms enjoy higher per-unit real profits as well as higher total real profits.
5.5 Pass-Through
We have seen that fairness concerns and cursed inference change the qualitative features of the
economy. One advantage of our approach is that its tractability allows for closed-form expressions
describing how equilibrium prices and quantities respond to money-supply and technology shocks.
Below we express the pass-through of money-supply shocks into prices to describe the response
of prices to money-supply shocks.
PROPOSITION 4. Consider an economy in which households make cursed inferences. The pass-
through of money-supply shocks into prices is
σ ≡ d ln(P)
d ln(M0)
=
[
1+
α
1+ξ
·
(
ε
ε−1 ·
1
µ
−1
)
·
(
1− 1
ψ+φ
)]−1
. (16)
When households do not care about fairness (φ = 0), the pass-through equals 1. When households
care about fairness (φ > 0), the pass-through is below 1 but above (ε − 1)/ε . The pass-through
approaches 1 when the economy approaches perfect competition (ε → ∞),
The fact that the pass-through is less than one when households make cursed inferences and
care about fairness means that prices exhibit a mild form of rigidity by moving less than propor-
tionally to the money supply.
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Proposition 4 expresses the pass-through as a function of standard macroeconomic parameters,
the fairness parameter φ , the markup µ , and the fairness factor ψ . Under the additional assumption
that we start from an equilibrium in which the actual, perceived, and fair markups coincide, the
pass-though can be simplified to depend only on standard macroeconomic parameters and φ .
COROLLARY 1. Consider an economy in which households make cursed inferences. Starting
from an equilibrium in which the actual markup, the perceived markup, and the fair markup coin-
cide, the pass-through of money-supply shocks into prices is
σ s =
[
1+
α
1+ξ
·
(
φ
1+φ
)2
· 1
ε−φ/(1+φ)
]−1
. (17)
When households care about fairness (φ > 0), the pass-through increases with the competitiveness
of the economy, ε , and decreases with fairness concerns, φ .
Following the same steps, we can compute the pass-through of technology shocks into prices,
defined as d ln(P)/d ln(a). Since higher technology means lower marginal costs, the price level de-
clines after an increase in technology and the pass-through is negative. Because ln(a) and− ln(M0)
enter symmetrically into (12) and (15), the pass-though of technology shocks into prices is simply
minus the pass-through of monetary shocks into prices. An implication is that a fall in technology
leads to a smaller price increase when the economy is less competitive and when households care
more about fairness.16
5.6 The Effect of Money-Supply Shocks on Welfare
We now turn to the welfare implications of our approach. We define two notions of welfare, one
with an emotional component and one without. Since a household’s utility is given by (1) and we
focus on a symmetric equilibrium, we define overall welfare to be
u = ln(c)+
1
η
· ln(M0)− 1η · ln(P)+
(
1+
1
η
)
· ln(ψ)−ν · 1
1+ξ
·h1+ξ .
16Once embedded into an international-trade model, our theory might help explain the incomplete pass-through
of exchange rates into import prices. For evidence of this incomplete pass-through, see for instance Goldberg and
Verboven [2001], Gopinath and Rigobon [2008], and Nakamura and Zerom [2010].
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We distinguish this from a second notion of welfare that omits fairness considerations; we define
unemotional welfare to be
uˆ = ln(c)+
1
η
· ln(M0)− 1η · ln(P)−ν ·
1
1+ξ
·h1+ξ .
Unemotional welfare is obtained by setting ψ = 1 in the overall welfare; it evaluates social welfare
as if households’ well-being did not depend upon their fairness concerns.
An increase in money supply affects overall welfare in two ways: it has a positive effect by
lessening the inefficiency due to monopolistic competition on the goods market; and it has a nega-
tive effect by increasing perceived markups, thereby reducing the perceived fairness of transactions
and angering households. The following proposition characterizes the response of overall welfare
to an increase in money supply, and contrasts it with the response of unemotional welfare.
PROPOSITION 5. When households care about fairness (φ > 0) and make cursed inferences, an
increase in money supply increases unemotional welfare but decreases overall welfare.
Proposition 5 contains the paper’s main welfare result. Although an increase in money supply
stimulates output and unemotional welfare, it reduces overall welfare because households feel un-
fairly treated when they see higher prices. The increase in unemotional welfare is directly tied to
the decrease in overall welfare. The very reason why unemotional welfare increases is that mo-
nopolistic markups decrease; this happens because firms know that higher prices upset households
and thus make their demand for goods more elastic; households’ anger in turn reduces overall wel-
fare. If households were not upset at higher prices (for instance, if they were rationally inferring
marginal costs from prices), overall welfare would not decrease, but unemotional welfare would
not increase either. The proposition also indicates that an econometrician looking only at a conven-
tional measure of welfare based on consumption, hours worked, and real money balances would
estimate an increase in welfare after an increase in money supply, even though overall welfare
would fall.
Our model predicts that expansionary monetary policy may be unpopular by upsetting people
with higher prices more than gratifying them with higher output. The impact of expansionary
monetary policy on overall welfare in our model accord well with the survey responses in Shiller
[1996], in which 85% of respondents report that they dislike inflation. In our model as in the
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survey, households are unhappy following an increase in money supply because they are angry
at what they perceive as higher markups after the increase in price—and in our model, they are
unhappy despite the increase in output.
The response of overall welfare to an increase in money supply in our model also sheds light
on the evidence provided by Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald [2001, 2003] that social well-being
is strongly reduced by inflation. Their data comes from the Euro-Barometer survey, which records
happiness and life-satisfaction information for nearly 265,000 people in 12 European countries
during the 1975–1991 period. They analyze how the residual macroeconomic well-being (the
level of well-being not explained by individual characteristics) depends on inflation. They find that
in terms of well-being, increasing the inflation rate by 1 percentage point has a large cost, similar
to the cost of increasing the unemployment rate by 0.6 percentage point.
While our model may be too simple to draw detailed implications for optimal monetary policy,
it does suggest that inflation can lead to first-order cost on welfare through people’s emotional
response to higher prices. This welfare cost is very different from the welfare cost of inflation
in existing monetary models. For instance, the standard New Keynesian model predicts that the
welfare cost of inflation arises from the price dispersion it creates when firms are subject to stag-
gered pricing [Galı´, 2008]. In our model, by contrast, inflation imposes a welfare cost that is
psychological. This cost derives from a mistaken belief by households that when prices rise after
an increase in money supply, transactions have become less fair. This misperception of unfairness
in turn reduces households’ welfare.
5.7 Evidence on Comparative-Statics Predictions
We discuss empirical evidence on the comparative-statics predictions of the model in which house-
holds care about fairness and make cursed inferences.
Proposition 2 predicts that in business cycles generated by money-supply shocks, markups are
countercyclical: higher money supply leads to lower markup and higher output, and conversely,
lower money supply leads to higher markups and lower output. Despite the large volume of empir-
ical work measuring the cyclical variation of markups, no consensus on cyclicality has emerged.
Rotemberg and Woodford [1999] provide an exhaustive survey of the empirical evidence. This
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evidence suggests that the labor share—the ratio of the real wage bill (W/P) ·h to output a ·hα—is
countercyclical. In our model the marginal and the average cost are proportional; thus, this empir-
ical evidence implies that the marginal cost is countercyclical and hence the markup is procyclical
(recall that the markup is the inverse of the marginal cost in a symmetric equilibrium). However,
Rotemberg and Woodford [1999] list several reasons why marginal cost may be more procyclical
than average cost. For instance, in good times workers earn overtime pay in excess of normal
earnings [Bils, 1987]. Adjusting the fluctuations of the labor share for such corrections, they con-
clude that the markup is countercyclical. More recently, using the cyclical behavior of inventories,
Bils and Kahn [2000] also estimate a countercyclical markup. But recent work by Nekarda and
Ramey [2013] using updated methods and data do not find a significant response of the markup to
aggregate-demand shocks—if anything, they find that a slightly procyclical markup.
Proposition 3 predicts that an increase in technology leads to higher output but lower hours
worked. This prediction is consistent with the empirical findings of several influential papers. Galı´
[1999] uses a structural vector autoregression to show that higher technology lead to higher output
but lower hours worked. The robustness of Gali’s findings is demonstrated by Francis and Ramey
[2005, 2009]. Last, using a measure of technological change that they have constructed, Basu,
Fernald and Kimball [2006] find that higher technology leads to slightly higher output but lower
hours worked, confirming Gali’s findings.
Proposition 3 also predicts that in business cycles generated by technology shocks, markups are
procyclical under: higher technology leads to higher markups and higher output, and conversely,
lower technology leads to lower markups and lower output. Nekarda and Ramey [2013] report
empirical evidence consistent with this prediction.
Corollary 1 predicts that the pass-through is smaller in less-competitive economies. Proposi-
tion 4 shows that the pass-through even goes to 1 as the economy becomes perfectly competitive.
This property echoes the finding of Carlton [1986] that prices are more rigid in industries that
are more concentrated. Proposition 4 also shows that the pass-through is smaller in economies in
which households care more about fairness. Our theory bridges two facts reported by Kackmeis-
ter [2007]. The first fact is that the fairness of transactions matters less today than it did in 1890
because the personal relationship between retailers and customers is weaker today than it was in
1890. The second fact is that retail prices were much more rigid in 1889–1891 than in 1997–1999.
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In our model, the first fact implies that φ is lower today than it was in 1890. The implication is that
the pass-through should be higher today than it was in 1890, and thus that prices should be more
flexible today than in 1890. This is the second fact that Kackmeister documents.
6 Conclusion
This paper builds a macroeconomic model in which the nonneutrality of money arises from two
well-documented psychological assumptions: (1) consumers are averse to paying prices in excess
of a fair markup over marginal cost; and (2) consumers fail to infer information about marginal
costs from their equilibrium relationship to other variables.
One advantage of our formulation is that it introduces only one new parameter—the fairness
parameter φ—into the canonical macroeconomic model of Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987]. Fur-
thermore, our model reduces to the Blanchard-Kiyotaki model for φ = 0. Since the departure from
the canonical model is minimal, our model could readily be used to address standard macroeco-
nomic questions. The model could also be used for quantitative analysis: this would only require
to calibrate φ , which could be achieved by matching the elasticity of output with respect to money
supply, d ln(c)/d ln(M0), in the model and in the data. Estimating this elasticity in the data would
offer an estimate of the pass-through σ because ln(c)/d ln(M0) = 1−σ . When evaluated around
a long-run equilibrium, the pass-through only depends on φ and standard parameters, as showed
by (17). Hence, the estimate of σ would provide a calibration for φ .
Another advantage of our formulation of fairness is that affects general equilibria, even with
perfect competition.17 In that, our approach differs from many models of social preferences that
have been developed to capture fairness concerns, such as Fehr and Schmidt [1999] and Charness
and Rabin [2002]. Our approach is different because in our model, consumers who feel mistreated
by firms withhold demand not to punish firms, as in models of social preferences, but instead be-
cause they derive less joy from consuming unfairly priced goods. A pivotal difference is that many
social preferences, including Fehr-Schmidt and Charness-Rabin preferences, satisfy a separability
condition, in the sense of Dufwenberg et al. [2011], whereas our preferences do not satisfy this
17Because we focus on a symmetric equilibrium with a common fair markup across goods, we found that fairness
played no role in the competitive limit of our model (ε → ∞). But with different fair markups for different goods,
fairness would matter even in the competitive limit.
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condition.18 Dufwenberg et al. [2011] show that preferences satisfying the separability condition
do not affect general equilibria with perfect competition. Our preferences do not satisfy this con-
dition, which is why they would affect the general equilibrium even with perfect competition, and
also why they have large effects on the general equilibrium with monopolistic competition. We
view both of these approaches as psychologically valid. We agree with Schmidt [2011] that so-
cial preferences that satisfy separability may play an important role in organizational settings with
agency problems such as moral hazard. We also believe that our preferences may play an important
role in macroeconomic general-equilibrium settings.
The main limitation of the model is that our modeling of the labor market is less than ideal:
households are monopolistic suppliers of labor setting their wage to maximize utility, so there is
no involuntary unemployment and no nominal-wage rigidity. Extending the model to have invol-
untary unemployment and nominal-wage rigidity would influence the positive and especially the
welfare analysis. These extensions would affect the impact of a positive money-supply shock on
welfare in at least three ways. First, as Akerlof, Dickens and Perry [1996] proposed, an increase
in money supply would erode real wages in the presence of nominal-wage rigidity, thus reducing
unemployment and improving economic efficiency beyond the improvement on the goods mar-
ket studied in this paper. Second, in the presence of involuntary unemployment, our analysis
suggests that an increase in money supply may leave an average worker with a stable job—who
looks very much like the representative household in the model—worse-off because the anger
from higher perceived markups dominates the added utility from higher consumption. However,
an increase in money supply might benefit an unemployed worker immensely by improving em-
ployment prospects through increased labor demand and higher hours worked. If unemployment
is very costly, either because of psychological and health costs or because workers are not well
insured against unemployment, then reducing unemployment would have a large positive effect on
welfare.19 Third, people seem to fear that rising prices outpace wages, and that inflation impover-
ish them. This fear features preeminently in Shiller [1996], and it could add to the cost of inflation
if both nominal wages and prices sluggishly adjust to shocks.
18Our preferences violate separability because each consumer’s preferences over her own consumption bundles
depend implicitly upon price.
19It is well documented that the state of unemployment has high psychological and health costs [for example, Clark
and Oswald, 1994; Hawton and Platt, 2000; Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009]. It is also established that consumption
drops significantly upon unemployment [for example, Gruber, 1997].
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Another limitation of the model is that, while it features a mild form of price rigidity whereby
the price level moves less than proportionally to the money supply, it does not captures the stronger
form of price rigidity uncovered in price microdata [for example, Bils and Klenow, 2004; Naka-
mura and Steinsson, 2008]. In these data, prices remain fixed for months at a time. However, a
natural extension of our model is likely to generate such rigidity. We could introduce a kink into
the fairness factor ψ to capture the property that consumers’ reluctance to pay prices above the fair
price is distinctly larger than their eagerness to pay prices below the fair price, which is similar
to the non-differentiability at the heart of the theory of loss aversion by Tversky and Kahneman
[1991]. We conjecture that such a kink would create an inaction region where firms maintain
their prices in the face of small money-supply shocks. This conjecture is informed by the work
of Sibly [2002] and Heidhues and Ko˝szegi [2008], who incorporate loss aversion into models of
price competition and find that prices remain unchanged following real cost shocks.20
A third limitation of the model is that firms have no ability to signal marginal costs to con-
sumers. Of course, firms facing increased marginal costs in our model have incentive to reveal
these costs to cursed consumers. The photos in Section 2 are anecdotal evidence that firms engage
in exactly this sort of signaling to fairness-minded consumers. The photos also suggest that con-
sumers make cursed inferences: because rational consumers would infer the worst—low marginal
costs—from the absence of signage, firms would always reveal their marginal costs. The fact that
some firms conceal their marginal costs indicates not only that consumers make cursed inference
but also that firms exploit consumers’ error, leading them to underestimate markups systematically.
By extending the model to allow for signaling, it would be possible to analyze formally the optimal
signaling strategy by firms and the properties of the general equilibrium with signaling.
Last, we explain the nonneutrality of money in a static model. Our model is meant to represent
the short-run response to monetary shocks. Of course, the effects of monetary shocks diminish
over time, and money is usually thought to be neutral in the long run. We suspect that the dynamic
extension of our model in which consumers gradually adjust their perceptions of marginal costs
would make exactly this prediction.
20These models define utility purely in real terms and impose rational expectations, so incorporating these ap-
proaches directly into a macroeconomic model would not explain the nonneutrality of money.
36
Appendix A: Derivations and Proofs
Solving the Households’ Utility-Maximization and Firms’ Profit-Maximization Problems.
Taking as given {Pi}, M0 j, and Π j, household j chooses
{
ci j
}
, M j, h j, and Wj to maximize (1)
subject to the constraint (2) (Lagrange multiplier A j) and to the constraint h j = hdj (Wj) (La-
grange multiplier B j). The labor demand hdj (Wj) gives the total number of hours that the firms
would choose to hire from household j at a nominal wage Wj. The labor demand is a decreas-
ing function of Wj determined below. The first-order conditions with respect to ci j for all i are
(ψi/z j) ·
(
zi j/z j
)−1/ε
=A j ·Pi, where we used the fact that ∂ z j/∂ zi j =
(
zi j/z j
)−1/ε di. Manipulat-
ing these first-order conditions yields
A j =
1
Pˆ · z j
. (18)
Combining these two results, we obtain the optimal consumption of good i for household j:
ci j =
z j
ψi
·
(
Pi/ψi
Pˆ
)−ε
.
Integrating the consumption of good i over all households yields the demand (5) for good i. Next,
the first-order condition with respect to M j is 1/(η ·M j) =A j. Combining this condition with (18)
yields (6).
Given household j’s demand for good i, the fairness-adjusted price index has the property
that the total cost of purchasing goods equals the fairness-adjusted price index times the fairness-
adjusted consumption index:
∫ 1
0
Pi · ci j di = Pˆ · z j.
This property can be verified by substituting in the expressions for the optimal ci j:
∫ 1
0
Pi · ci jdi = Pˆ ·
∫ 1
0
Pi
Pˆ
· ci jdi = Pˆ · z j ·
∫ 1
0
(
Pi/ψi
Pˆ
)1−ε
di = Pˆ · z j · Pˆ
1−ε
Pˆ1−ε
= Pˆ · z j.
Due to this property, Pˆ is the price index used by households to deflate nominal money balances in
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the utility function.
Because the number of hours worked by household j depends upon firms’ demand for its
labor, we turn to the firm’s profit maximization problem before returning to the household. The
firm maximizes profits (4) subject to the constraint ci = cdi (Pi) (with Lagrange multiplier Ci) and
the constraint (3) (with Lagrange multiplier Di). The demand curve cdi (Pi) is given by (5).
The first-order conditions with respect to hi j for all j are Wj = Di · ai ·α · hα−1i · (hi j/hi)−1/γ ,
where we used the fact that ∂hi/∂hi j =
(
hi j/hi
)−1/γ d j. Manipulating these first-order conditions
yields
Di =
W
ai ·α ·hα−1i
, (19)
where W ≡
(∫ 1
0 W
1−γ
j d j
) 1
1−γ is the nominal wage index. Combining these two results, we obtain
the optimal number of hours of labor that firm i should hire from household j:
hi j = hi ·
(
Wj
W
)−γ
.
Integrating the number of hours over all firms i yields the labor demand (7) faced by household j.
Next, the first-order conditions with respect to ci and Pi are Pi =Ci+Di and ci =−Ci ·dcdi /dPi.
Combining these conditions with (19) yields (9).
Having determined the labor demands faced by households, we come back to household j
and determine the wage Wj that it sets. The first-order conditions with respect to h j and Wj are
ν ·hξj =A j ·Wj +B j and A j ·h j =B j ·dhdj/dWj. Combining these conditions with (18) and (6),
and using the fact that −(Wj/h j) · (dhdj/dWj) = γ , we find that household j sets its wage as in (8).
Proof of Proposition 1. Firms understand that households are rational and therefore able to infer
their marginal cost MC. Rational households understand the pricing strategy of firms, namely that
the markup satisfies µ = µ(µ p), where µ(µ p) is given by (14). For households to infer correct
marginal costs, it must be that µ p = µ in equilibrium. Hence the equilibrium markup µ∗ satisfies
µ∗ = µ(µ∗). Because households know all of the parameters that enter the function µ(µ p), they
can indeed determine µ∗ and, hence, learn MC.
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Since µ = µ∗, equation (15) implies that hours are independent of money supply and technol-
ogy. Equation (13) implies that the real wage is independent of money supply but proportional
to technology. Equation (3) implies that output is independent of money supply but proportional
to technology. Equation (12) implies that the price level is proportional to money supply and in-
versely proportional to technology. By combining the definition of nominal profits, given by (4),
the optimal pricing decision of firms, given by (9), and the production constraint, given by (3), we
obtain an expression for real profits
Π
P
= c ·
(
1− α
µ
)
. (20)
that is independent of money supply but proportional to technology. The only remaining non-
trivial part of the proof is to compare profits in the equilibria with and without fairness concerns.
To do so, we compute the elasticity of real profits with respect to the markup. Equation (3) im-
plies that d ln(c)/d ln(h) = α and equation (15) implies that d ln(h)/d ln(µ) = −1/(1+ ξ ) so
d ln(c)/d ln(µ) = −α/(1+ ξ ). The definition of real profits implies that d ln(Π/P)/d ln(µ) =
d ln(c)/d ln(µ)+α/(µ−α). Combining these results, we obtain
d ln(Π/P)
d ln(µ)
= α ·
(
1
µ−α −
1
1+ξ
)
. (21)
Since 1/(1+ξ )< 1, the elasticity is positive as long as µ < 1+α .
Proof of Proposition 2. Equation (12) implies that a high realization of M0 shifts the downward-
sloping curve upward in Figure 6(a). Hence, P and h are higher in equilibrium. Equations (13) and
(3) imply that W/P and c are higher. Since P is higher and the perceived cost, MC, remains the
same, µ p = P/MC is higher and ψ = 1−φ+φ ·µ f /µ p is lower. But when µ p is higher, Lemma 1
tells us that µ = µ(µ p) is lower. The response of µ determines that of real profits, Π/P. The
elasticity (21) of Π/P with respect to µ remains valid here. As we have argued, this elasticity is
positive when µ < 1+α; in this case, Π/P is lower.
Proof of Proposition 3. Equation (12) implies that a high realization of a shifts the downward-
sloping curve downward in Figure 6(b). Hence, P and h are lower in equilibrium. Equation (13)
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implies that W/P increases less than proportionally to technology. In fact, the elasticity of W/P
with respect to a is d ln(W/P)/d ln(a) = 1−(1−σ) · [1+ξ/α] where σ ≡−d ln(P)/d ln(a) is the
pass-through of technology shocks into prices. The analysis of the pass-through that we conduct
below shows that σ satisfies (16) so σ ∈ (0,1). Hence, d ln(W/P)/d ln(a) is strictly less than 1
and it could be negative. Equation (15) also implies that P ·a increases; in other words, P does not
decrease as much as 1/a. Since P ·a increases but P decreases, (6) implies that c increases but c/a
decreases. Since P decreases, µ p decreases and ψ increases. Lemma 1 implies that µ = µ(µ p)
increases. Since c increases and µ increases, (20) implies that real profits increase. In fact, (20)
implies that
d ln(Π/P)
d ln(a)
=
∂ ln(Π/P)
∂ ln(a)
∣∣∣∣
µ
+
∂ ln(Π/P)
∂ ln(µ)
∣∣∣∣
a
· d ln(µ)
d ln(a)
.
Since ∂ ln(c)/∂ ln(a)
∣∣
µ = 1, (20) implies that ∂ ln(Π/P)/∂ ln(a)
∣∣
µ = 1. Furthermore, ∂ ln(Π/P)/∂ ln(µ)
∣∣
a
is given by (21) so it is positive if µ < 1+α . Last, we have showed that d ln(µ)/d ln(a)> 0. We
conclude that d ln(Π/P)/d ln(a)> 1 if µ < 1+α .
Proof of Proposition 4. Some algebra shows that the price-elasticity of µ(P/MC) is
d ln(µ(P/MC))
d ln(P)
=
[
1− ε
ε−1 ·
1
µ
]
·
[
1− 1
ψ+φ
]
< 0.
The elasticity is negative because µ < ε/(ε − 1) and ψ + φ = 1+ φ · (µ f /µ) ≥ 1. The logic
behind the negative elasticity is that an increase in price raises the perceived markup, forcing
firms to reduce their markup. Next, (15) and (12) imply that d ln(h)/d ln(µ) = −1/(1+ξ ) and
d ln(P)/d ln(M0) = 1−α · d ln(h)/d ln(µ) · d ln(µ)/d ln(P) · d ln(P)/d ln(M0). Combining these
results yields (16).
Proof of Proposition 5. We prove the second statement first by computing the effect du/d ln(M0)
of a money-supply shock on welfare. The response of the price level to a money-supply shock is
the pass-through: d ln(P)/d ln(M0) = σ . The response of consumption to a money-supply shock
is solely determined by the pass-through: (6) implies that d ln(c)/d ln(M0) = 1−σ . The response
of hours to a money-supply shock is solely determined by the pass-through and the parameter
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α: equations (3) and (6) imply that d ln(h)/d ln(M0) = (1−σ)/α . In a symmetric equilibrium,
ψ = 1−φ +φ ·µ f ·MC/P so d ln(ψ)/d ln(P) = − [1− (1−φ)/ψ] and d ln(ψ)/d ln(M0) = −σ ·
[1− (1−φ)/ψ]. Bringing all these effects together and using (15), which shows that (ν/α) ·
h1+ξ = 1/µ , we obtain
du
d ln(M0)
= (1−σ) ·
(
1+
1
η
− 1
µ
)
−σ ·
(
1+
1
η
)
·
(
1− 1−φ
ψ
)
. (22)
We now determine the sign of du/d ln(M0). Using the expression (16) for the pass-through, we
find that du/d ln(M0)< 0 if and only if
α
1+ξ
·
(
ε
ε−1 ·
1
µ
−1
)
· ψ
ψ+φ
·
(
1− η
1+η
· 1
µ
)
< 1.
To obtain this inequality, we used the facts that σ > 0, η > 0, and (1− φ)/ψ ∈ (0,1) such that
we could divide both sides of the inequality by σ · [1− (1−φ)/ψ] · (1+η)/η without chang-
ing its sign. Next, we have α/(1+ ξ ) ∈ (0,1) since ξ > 0 and α ∈ (0,1). We also have 1−
η/ [(1+η) ·µ] ∈ (0,1) since η > 0 and µ > 1. Hence, we find that du/d ln(M0)< 0 if(
ε
ε−1 ·
1
µ
−1
)
· ψ
ψ+φ
< 1.
Given that ψ = 1− φ + φ · µ f /µ p in a symmetric equilibrium, (14) implies that ψ/(ψ+φ) =
(ε−1) · (µ−1). Thus, a sufficient condition for du/d ln(M0)< 0 is
(ε−1) ·
(
ε
ε−1 −µ
)
· (µ−1)−µ < 0.
Let Q(x) = (ε − 1) · (ε/(ε−1)− x) · (x− 1)− x. In equilibrium, µ ∈ (1,ε/(ε − 1)). Hence, a
sufficient condition for du/d ln(M0)< 0 is Q(x)< 0 for all x∈ (1,ε/(ε−1)). The polynomial Q is
of degree 2 with a negative coefficient on x2 so it is strictly convex. Since Q′(x)= 2 ·(ε−1) ·(1−x),
Q′(1) = 0 and the polynomial Q admits a global maximum in 1. Since Q(1) = −1 < 0, we infer
that Q(x)< 0 for all x. The implication is that du/d ln(M0)< 0 for all µ ∈ (1,ε/(ε−1)).
Last. we prove the first statement. We denote unemotional welfare by uˆ. Setting φ = 0 and
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ψ = 1 in (22) yields
duˆ
d ln(M0)
= (1−σ) ·
(
1+
1
η
− 1
µ
)
.
Since σ ∈ (0,1), µ > 1, and η > 0, we find that duˆ/d ln(M0)> 0.
Appendix B: Fairness According to French Bakers
To better understand how firms take fairness concerns into account, we interviewed 31 bakers in
France in the summer of 2007. The French bread market provides a good example of a large market
where sellers and buyers have personal relationships and where consumers likely care about the
fairness of prices.21 The French bread market also makes for a good case study because French
people care a lot about the price of bread, which bakers can set freely.22
Following the approach of Bewley [1999], the interviews were only loosely directed. We
sampled bakeries in cities and villages around Grenoble, Aix-en-Provence, Paimpol, and Paris.
The numbers of interviews is small; yet, the responses shed light on fairness constraints on pricing.
Overall, the interviews show that bakers’ efforts to preserve customer loyalty constrain price
variations. Price adjustments are guided by norms of fairness to avoid antagonizing customers; in
particular, cost-based pricing is widely used. Bakers explained that they would raise the price of
bread only in response to cost increases: when the price of flour goes up (generally once a year
in September at the end of harvest), when utilities go up (especially gas, required to operate the
oven), or when wages go up. Some bakers explained that their largest costs were the wages of their
employees, which are linked to the minimum wage. Since the minimum wage is updated every
2165% of French households patronize a bakery at least once a week, and those who do so average 3.7 visits per
week [Eymard, 1999]. Traditional bakeries employ broadly 148,000 workers, for a yearly turnover of 3.2 billion euros,
which represents 68% of the total bread market [Fraichard, 2006].
22Since August 1978, French bakers have been free to set their own bread and pastry prices, except during the
inflationary period between 1979 and 1987 when price ceilings and growth caps were mandated. For centuries, bread
prices caused major social upheaval. Before the French Revolution, the king had incentive to ensure readily avail-
able and reasonably priced bread: Miller [1999] writes that “[a]ffordable bread prices underlay any hopes for urban
tranquility”. During the Flour War (May 1775), mobs chanted “[i]f the price of bread does not go down, we will
exterminate the king and the blood of the Bourbons”. (In French, this rhymes.) Following these riots, the king capped
the price of bread at 2 sous per pound, the “ordinary” price of bread in the 18th century. During periods of scarcity,
bakers were required to sell at some fair, historical price. Those who refused saw their bakeries and warehouses looted
or robbed. Crowds pillaged bakeries in Paris during the Flour War, shouting “we must have bread” [Kaplan, 1996].
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July 1st and the bakers only change their price in response to a cost change, they only change their
price once a year on July 1st.
In fact, bakers attach such importance to convincing their customers of fair markups that their
trade union decomposes into minute detail the cost of bread and the rationale for any price rise,
calculating the markups for various types of bread and explaining their evolution over time. They
emphasize that prices increase only in response to cost increases, with any increase announced
long in advance and explained carefully.23 Baker behavior suggests that customers only tolerate
price increases justified by cost increases. We have seen several signs posted in bakeries almost
identical to those pictured in Figure 1.
Not only do bakers seem to set their price as a fixed markup over their cost, but they also
consciously refuse to increase prices in response to increased demand: bakers find it unfair to
respond to demand shocks. Several bakers explained that they refuse to change prices during the
week-ends (when more people typically shop at bakeries), during the holiday absences of local
competitors (when their demand and market power rise), or during the summer tourist season
(again, when demand rises). Bakers feel that a price rise would anger and drive away customers.
23The webpage is at http://www.boulangerie.net/forums/bnweb/prixbaguette.php.
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